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1. The Homo Economicus 
Since the days of Adam Smith, economie science is addressing itself 
to an efficiënt use of scarce resources. Scarcity problems have 
always made up the heart of economics. The post-war economie growth 
and its resulting welfare have put economics in a difficult position, 
however, as in the post-war period the western societies were charac-
terized by abundance rather than by scarcity. Due to the postulate 
of infinite needs the 'homo economicus' was assumed to oriënt himself 
always towards a maximization of efficiency, so that non-market impacts 
(pollution, e.g.) could not appropriately be taken into consideration 
in utility and decision analysis. 
Problems of environmental decay - first signalled by non-economists -
appeared to become so urgent in the past decades, that economists were 
induced to include environmental issues in their conventional accounting 
schames, sometimes even in the framework of economie equilibrium analysis 
(see for instance, Maler, 1974). 
In contrast with attempts at accomodating environmental issues to 
traditional economie approaches, several new endeavours were also made 
to substitute the (neo-classical) maximizing paradigm for refreshing 
foundations for economics, such as the 'spaceship earth' paradigm (see 
Boulding, 1966), the 'steady state' paradigm (see Daly, 1973), and the 
'Gaia' paradigm (see Margulis and Lovelock, 1976). The major aim of 
such alternative paradigms for an economie use of scarce resources has 
been to replace the antroprocentric approach of economics by new 
approaches focusing on stability and on harmony with nature, in which in 
addition to theoretical economie reasoning also socio-economic and 
political ethical postulatescould play an intrinsic role. 
Although these alternative approaches have provided stimuli for new 
ways of thinking, the main stream of economics has still concentrated 
its attention on conventional neo-classical economics as the major 
viewpoint for dealing with environmental issues. This is also witnessed 
by terms like 'optimal pollution' and 'environmental capital', indicating 
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that the homo economicus is still regarded as the 'crown of creation' 
who dominates nature (see Leopold, .1972) and whose deepest motive is 
'on and on and up and up' (see Coppock, 1974). Despite the increased 
interest in environmental issues, the aim of a permanent increase in 
flows of commodities and services is still dominant, while environ- • 
mental quality is at best taken into account as a constraint (see for 
an interesting survey, Fietkau et al., 1982). 
Fortunately, in the past decade also several successful attempts have 
been undertaken to incorporate environmental targets in a more appropri-
ate way in environmental-economic planning models and evaluation analysis. 
It is then assumed that the economie meaning of choice items (including 
'environmental commodities') is to be found in the fact that they have 
an impact on the satisfaction of needs in so far as these are related 
to the use of scarce resources (cf. Robbins , 1952). In contrast with 
neo-classical economics, however, these modern approaches do not take 
for granted that the social value of a commodity is reflected in its 
market value, as otherwise unpriced commodities (like the quality of the 
environment) would be excluded from an operational economie analysis. 
Especially in the field of conflict analysis, multiple objective choice 
analysis, multi-attribute utility theory and multiple criteria evalua-
tion analysis much progress have been made in incorporating environmental 
issues in economie analysis (see for instance, Hafkamp, 1984, Nijkamp, 
1979, 1980, and Rietveld, 1981). The major importance of these recent 
operational approaches is that the postulate of a homo economicus does 
not imply that rational economie behaviour automatically takes for 
granted the maximization of efficiency (see later); alternative objectives 
can in principle be taken into account. 
Here we are touching upon another extremely difficult problem: conven-
tional economie reasoning is based on an individualistic value theory, 
as micro preferences included in disaggregate utility functions ultimately 
determine the market value and distribution of commodities. Bö'hm 
Bawerk has already pointed out that this assumption leads to an over-
assessment of current needs and of the future potential of the economy, 
and to an underassessment of future needs (see Hardin, 1968, and Roll, 
1973). The distributional problems emerging from the traditional 
rationality postulate of the homo economicus are indeed rather severe, 
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both over time (intergenerational trade-offs, e.g.), over space 
(regional disparity profiles, e.g.), or over groups (segmentated 
welfare profiles, e.g.). These distributional problems are already 
complicated in a normal market system, but they are really intriguing 
in case of non-priced commodities (environmental decay, e.g.). 
Here the efficiency-equity dilemma leads to incommensurable trade-off 
problems, because normally efficiency criteria can be translated into 
the 'common measuring rod of money', whereas equity criteria cannot 
be consistently linked to any common monetary denominator. Especially 
in current environmental management problems, such trade-off issues 
cannot easily be solved. 
Consequently, distributional conflicts in economic-environmental policy 
analysis are very hard to solve. And these conflicts tend to increase 
as objectives of industrial revitalisation caused by the current economie 
stagnation offers less space for distributional considerations of 
environmental commodities or policies across different socio-economic 
groups. Thus the economie costs and benefits of environmental and 
resource policies tend to become distributed in such a manner that the 
final outcome is again reflecting the aim of the homo economicus as a 
hedonistic efficiency maximizer. It should be added however that recently 
also some refreshing views have been expressed on the rationality 
postulate for 'the economics of altruism' (Margolis, 1982). 
From a methodological viewpoint the question arises whether and how 
distributional issues of environmental policy can be linked in a meaning-
ful way to efficiency goals, so that environmental and resource manage-
ment is also taking account of (re-)distributional aspects (see also 
Pearce, 1982, and Zimmermann, 1981, 1983). In this regard, it is 
necessary to treat the question of separability and inseparability in 
equity-efficiency approaches to economie and environmental policy 
analysis. This will be further discussed in the next section. 
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2. Separable and Inseparable Distributional Issues in 
Environmental Policy Analysis 
Environmental choices have strongly distributional impacts for two 
reasons: 
- the 'consumption of environmental commodities' is different 
among individuals and groups in a country due to differences 
in income and time budgets and in settlement patterns (cf. 
Freeman, 1972) ; 
- the policies tó restore the quality of environmental commodi-
ties have different benefits and different costs for individuals 
and groups in a country (cf. Zimmermann, 1981). 
Unfortunately, conventional welfare theory has not offered much poten-
tial for including environmental equity issues in a practical way in 
the analysis, as also the notion of externalities was often based on 
efficiency considerations. 
In Nijkamp (1978), a typology of external effects has been presented, 
and it may be interesting to examine in how far these various categories 
of externalities are able to encompass (separable or inseparable) environ-
mental equity issues. 
(D pecuniary and technological externalities 
Pecuniary externalities are price-related indirect effects, while 
technological externalities are non-market effects. None of these 
categories however is able to take explicitly account of environ-
mental distribution effects. 
(2) separable and non-separable externalities 
Separable externalities are caused by environmental effects that 
do not affect the marginal priorities of actors. These catego-
riesdo implicitly take into consideration distributional effects, 
but do not provide an operational contribution in a policy 
context. 
These externalities are based on the distinction whether or 
not environmental decay takes place in both ways. Given the 
spatial background of reciprocal effects, there are implicit-
ly some distributional issues involved, but this distinction 
has not led to a more satisfactory treatment of environmental 
equity problems in a practical conflict situation. 
(4) depletable and non-depletable externalities 
DepIetabIe externalities emerge, if the 'consumption of environ-
mental deterioration' by one group means a reduction of environ-
mental deterioration for other groups. This distinction implies 
a clear consideration of distributional aspects, but does not 
lead to any theoretically-based policy rule. 
(5) marginal and inframarginal externalities 
This distinction is based on the question whether marginal 
changes in environmental choices of one group affects the wel-
fare position of others. Also this distinction has some distri-
butional aspectsj but does not provide a solution to separable 
equity problems either. 
(6) potentially relevant and irrelevant externalities 
An external effect is potentially relevant, if it stimulates 
the 'victim' of environmental deterioration to undertake actions 
in order to change the behaviour of the polluter. This distinc-
tion is not particularly relevant for environmental equity issues, 
Altogether the eonclusion can be drawn that the conventional views on 
externality concepts do not provide a fruitful operational contribution 
to the separability problem in environmental equity analysis. 
It is often assumed that environmental policy has a negative impact on 
the personal income distribution, as lower income groups tend to 
benefit much less than higher income groups. Conventional allocation 
rules for environmental quality management however, do not take into 
account the distributional impacts, as these rules are only based on 
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on efficiency considerations. Given the efficiency paradigm, one can 
use the neo-classical marginality rules to achieve a Pareto-optimal 
situation (cf. Baumol and Oates, 1975, and Dorfman, 1977), but this 
Pareto optimum is only based on aggregate costs and aggregate bene-
fits. However, when the distribution of costs does not coincide with 
the distribution of benefits over individuals or groups in society, 
the social meaning of a Pareto optimum becomes doubtful (see also 
McGuire and Aaron, 1969). Consequently, a separate treatment of 
allocation and distribution in a welfare-theoretic policy context is 
not very meaningful. 
ünfortunately, however, many welfare-theoretic contributions are based 
on a sequential analysis of allocation and distribution, as in the first 
stage efficiency is maximized, while in the next stage the implication 
of allocation decisions for equity are examined. The separability impli-
citly assumed here leads to a preponderance of efficiency criteria. 
It should be added however, that also the 'dual' approach in political 
economy emphasizing a primacy of equity considerations foliowed by an 
examination of efficiency implications, rests upon the same weak 
assumption of separability of allocation and distribution. 
One may argue however, that in the real world both efficiency and 
equity are simultaneously determined by the outcome of socio-economic 
and political processes, so that there is no substantial argument in 
favour of the separability assumption (except for pragmatic policy 
reasons). 
In principle,three possibilities do exist to link allocation rules to 
distribution rules in a welfare-theoretic context. 
The first possibility is based on a formal welfare theory and regards 
all items that have an impact on social welfare (including environ-
mental quality, distribution of income, distribution of environmental 
costs and benefits) as formal arguments of a social welfare function. 
If information were available on measurable indicators for the above-
mentioned items, and if information were available on their functional 
structure (i.e., the way these items are linked to each other), the 
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nórmal marginality rules can be used to derive optimality conditions 
that encompass also distributional indicators as welfare arguments. 
This approach has two limitations, however: 
it is still based on aggregate rules, so that the interest of 
individuals and groups is only reflected in one single distri-
bution criterion (a Pareto-a , e.g.); 
it takes also for granted information on trade offs among all 
arguments of a social welfare function (including distributional 
issues). 
The second approach is based on a more disaggregate view. It takes 
for granted that it is possible to attribute all benefits and costs of 
environmental policy to specific groups in society. This means that 
the distributional problems are attacked by a detailed impact analysis of 
groups that are affected by environmental costs and benefits (cf. 
Lichfield et al., 1975). 
In this case, however, one can only apply a policy-ofiented welfare 
approach, if a priori the relative importance to be attached to each 
separate group is known (see also Voogd, 1983). In that case the opti-
mality rule includes directly the distributional issues on the design 
of environmental policy programs. Of course, also this approach has 
some limitations: 
- the precise assessment of costs and benefits over groups is 
fraught with difficulties; 
the explicit assignment of importance weights to different groups 
is, in a policy context, not very operational. 
The third possibility emerging from modern conflict analysis, may be 
based on a mix of both foregoing options, by assuming that social 
welfare is determined by allocational and distributional impacts at 
either a micro or a macro level. It is also then assumed that a conflict 
does exist between allocational and distributional issues without know-
ing explicitly the weights to be attached to these issues, but on the basis 
of Information on trade offs among efficiency and equity, relevant informa-
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tion on the possibility or efficiency frontier is available. Multiple ob-
jective decision analysis is able to indicate how - usually on the basis of 
a 'satisficer' approach - a compromise solution can be reached in an 
interactive manner (see among others, Hafkamp, 1984, Nijkamp, 1980, 
and Rietveld, 1981). This approach will further be taken up in the 
sequel of the paper. 
In each of the abovementioned three possibilities, financial aspects, 
price repercussions, environmental quality standards, and environmental 
policy principles (such as the 'polluter pays' principle) can , in 
principle, be taken into account, either in a general or in a partial 
equilibrium framework. The disaggregate approach to efficiency-equity 
problems is once more interesting as in relevant years many advances 
have been made in the area of discrete individual choice modelling 
(for instance, based on random utility analysis), so that the utility-
based choices of groups can be taken into account in a much more 
appropriate manner (see for instance, Manski and McFadden, 1981). 
In principle, current economie methodology allows the inclusion of 
integrated efficiency-equity issues in a modern welfare-theoretic 
framework, though in a practical institutional setting this approach 
is still fraught with many limitations. 
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3. Environmental Equity Issues in Conventional 
Policy Analysis . 
Not only in theoretical analyses, but also in practical policy 
analysis the separability problem of environmental equity and effi-
ciency is of major importance. Pareto efficiency as such does not 
provide any meaningful support in identifying an acceptable social 
equity situation as long as the individual marginal rates of substi-
tutiori between environmental quality and private goods do not coincide 
with the individual marginal cost shares of environmental management 
(see also Aaron and McGuire, 1969). The inability of conventional 
approaches to economics to take into account distributional issues has 
also had a profound impact on various policy-analytic tools that have 
been designed to assist public policy-makers in rationalizing complex 
choices in environmental management problems, as is particularly 
witnessed in social cost-benefit analysis as the neo-classical tooi 
par excellence in policy analysis. 
Cost-benefit analysis aims at judging the 'societal surplus' of public 
investment decisions, based on an efficiency principle emerging from 
the tnaximization of the consumer surplus (i.e., the difference between 
the maximum willingness to pay and the price actually paid) (cf. Das-
gupta and Pearce, 1972). The inclusion of environmental externalities 
in a social cost-benefit framework is far from easy, as there is in 
general a wide variety of measures to cope with such externalities: 
negotiations 
moral conviction 
- direct policy measures, such as: 
constructing pollution abatement equipment 
establishing environmental quality standards 
assigning a system of waste rationing 
edicting pollution prohibitions 
- indirect policy measures, such as: 
financial charges 
subsidies. 
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Each of these measures has different distributional impacts and the 
problem of inseparability of environmental efficiency-equity differs 
for each specific policy measure. Unfortunately, social cost-benefit 
analysis has only had limited attention for such distributional issues. 
Only in the area of political economy more attention has been focused 
on important equity aspects of environmental management issues. 
A prominent early figure in this field has been Kapp (1950), who 
- in line with Marx and Veblen - has clearly pointed out that the 
restrictive scope of neo-classical economics is caused by its own value 
judgements regarding efficiency in a free market system, as this system 
induces entrepreneurs to transfer unpriced negative externalities to 
weaker groups in society (cf. also Galbraith, 1970). 
Neo-classical economists have argued that negative externalities can 
be dealt - at least in principle - by means of a compensation for the 
loss in individual welfare, so that negative externalities are then 
internalized (cf. Mishan, 1968). There are however, important theore-
tical and practical limitations inherent in the compensation method, 
such as: 
It is often only a two-party model.in which the outcomes are 
determined by the relative power of the parties. 
- It is only a partial equilibrium model, as negative externalities 
can only be transferred to other groups not directly involved. 
- The usual 'small numbers' case in theory precludes an application 
in a complex social context (cf. Baumol and Oates, 1975). 
- It takes for granted unambiguous cause-effect relationships 
which do not exist in practice (cf. the acid rain problem). 
- The outcomes of the compensation method are also determined by 
the jurisdictional system (cf. Mishan, 1971). 
- The assessment of revealed preferences and perceptions regarding 
environmental issues is fraught with difficulties (cf. Ramsay 
and Anderson, 1975). 
- The sometimes high transaction costs may sometimes lead to a 
continuation of negative environmental externalities (cf. Mishan, 
1971). 
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- The compensation method does not aim to reduce environ-
mental decay, but only to compensate for welfare losses 
associated with environmental decay. 
The compensation has been introduced in order to save neo-classical 
economie analysis in a situation with non-priced welfare effects.. In 
so far as the compensation model is based on individual welfare com-
pensation, it is able to include distributional issues without falling 
even in the trap of the separability-inseparability dilemma, as then 
allocation and distribution (via compensation) are simultaneously taken 
into consideration. However, two major problems still remain: 
- a welfare compensation is a theoretical construct that does not 
provide any direction regarding the transformation of welfare 
losses into monetary units; 
the theoretical solution of individual welfare compensation 
does not provide any direction as to how to include this approach 
*-
n a
 social cost-benefit framework. 
Consequently, social cost-benefit analysis has not been able to over-
come the separability dilemma in policy analysis. Distributional issues 
could at best be included by means of rather global compensation rules 
(for instance, based on an average willingness to pay), but general fair-
ness principles (cf. Rawls, 1972) were left out of consideration. 
Rawls' view that an unequal distribution can only be justified, if this 
situation means a benefit for weaker socioeconomic groups,could be a 
good starting point for intergenerational equity analysis, but it has 
never been applied in this context. 
Even the ability-to-pay principle was already hard to incorporate in a 
social cost-benefit context. In conclusion, conventional policy analysis 
has not provided operational instruments for an appropriate treatment 
of distributional issues in environmental management. 
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4. Environmental Equity Issues in Society, in Space and 
in Time 
In this section a closer look at specific environmental distribution 
issues will be taken, by making a distinction between equity issues 
for different groups, for different regions and for different time 
periods. 
As mentioned before, social cost-benefit analysis is unable to encom-
pass environmental equity issues for two reasons: (a) the inability 
to transform non-market impacts into a consistent and manageable price 
system, and (b) the inability to integrate distributional aspects of 
environmental issues in an efficiency context. 
There is essentially only one evaluation method for public policy 
that is capable of dealing with equity issues for socio-economic groups, 
viz. the planning balance sheet method. This method, originally designed 
by Lichfield et al. (1975), may be regarded as an extended cost-benefit 
analysis, in which social aspects and distributional effects on individ-
uals or groups are also taken into account.in a detailed manner. 
The method itself is based on so-called planning balance sheets re-
presenting an extensive and detailed account of all impacts of public 
policy measures and of the extent to which socio-economic groups are 
affected in their well-being after the implementation of a policy 
decision. The elements of well-being are not necessarily expressed in a 
monetary denominator: even qualitative information may be used. 
Planning balance sheet analysis may be considered as an improvement of 
conventional cost-benefit analysis. Clearly, its applicability depends 
very much on the available information. Another problem is that the 
socio-economic distribution of plan impacts is assessed, but that no 
mechanism is developed to arrive at priority schemes for the distribu-
tion, so that an integration with the effectiveness principle is hardly 
possible. Consequently, this method is an important step forward to a 
consideration of both efficiency and equity aspects of environmental 
management, but does not lead to a meaningful solution for the separa-
bility dilemma. 
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If we focus attention on regions, the same remarks can be made. The 
assessment of spatial impacts of environmental management and policy 
decisions is again in principle possible, but it still is an open 
question whether the separability problem can be solved by means of 
a spatially-oriented planning balance method. 
Finally, environmental equity issues may also be related to an inter-
generational tradeoff over different time periods. Usually, public 
policy measures in the field of environmental management will have a 
multi-period effect, so that the judgement of these effects has also 
efficiency and equity aspects. Here the major problem is whether the 
future generation should bear the burden of current short-sighted 
environmental management, or whether they should benefit from delib-
erate rational environmental policy decisions taken by the present 
generation. 
Surprisingly enough, economics has only provided a 'solution' for 
intertemporal or intergenerational equity-efficiency judgements, viz. 
by using the notion of a discount rate (see also Herfindahl and Kneese, 
1974, and Marglin, 1963). This discount rate is normally used to 
transform future impacts into present values, so that future and current 
streams of benefits and costs can be made commensurate. Usually the 
assumption is made that in a fully operating market system the discount 
rate should be in agreement with the marginal efficiency of capital, so 
that the rate of return in the public sector should be linked to that 
in the private sector. If the rate of discount would be very high, a 
consideration of socialbenefits of a project to future generations would 
be precluded. If however, the discount rate would be low, private 
capital (normally having a higher efficiency) would be substituted for 
public capital (see also Abelson, 1979, and Myers, 1979). 
An important but often neglected aspect of the use of a discount rate, 
is directly related to the present value of a plan, viz. the reinvest-
ment possibilities of the net benefits of this plan (see also Rouwendal 
and Nijkamp, 1984). By introducing this possibility the remaining 
net benefits for each future generation can be judged by means of 
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so-called net generation benefits. This also places more emphasis 
on the question as to how the possibilities of a particular future 
generation have to be weighted against those of other generations 
(including the present one). 
The existence of a discount rate for multi-period equity problems 
evokes the question whether it would be possible to imagine also a 
multi-region or multi-group discount rate. In other words: is it 
possible to introducé the concept of a spatial and social discount 
rate? This can be illustrated by using a three-dimensional block 
representing the social, spatial and time distributions of an 
(environmental) policy measure. 
Figure 1. A social-spatial-time distribution block. 
Each element from this block reflects the net benefits of a public 
policy measure. It is clear that the time process is easy to under-
stand: this is an irreversible process and the policy measure gener-
ates net benefits in each period. Depending on the marginal efficiency 
of capital, these benefits can be recalculated into present values by 
using the time discount rate. 
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Spatial discount rates have also often been used to represent the 
decreasing impact of an initial stimulus through space (for instance, 
in transportation and migration models). This conventional discount 
rate (for continuous or discrete spatial interaction problems) has 
however nothing to do with our problem of the judgement of the dis-
tribution of net benefits in space and time. It could however be 
imagined that - in agreement with conventional theory on discount 
rates - the marginal efficiency of capital investments would be differ-
ent in each region of the spatial system at hand. Then there is a 
certain rationale to regard this difference as an indication for the 
rates of return in successive regions, so that - even within a given 
time period - the distribution scheme of benefits over different 
regions could be weighted by means of adjusted discount rates for 
spatially discriminating effects of environmental policy measures (cf. 
Nijkamp, 1984). 
Social discount rates have never explicitly been used, though in policy 
practice the existence of different parties and interest groups indi-
cates that implicitly each environmental policy decision is reflecting 
a social discount rate. The theoretical foundation of such an implicit 
social discount rate by means of marginal efficiency of capital concept 
is however an almost impossible task. 
In conclusion, the use of a social-spatial-time discount rate is for the 
moment not a very promising approach for both methodological and 
practical reasons. 
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5. Equity Issues in Environmental Economie Models 
In the past decades a great many models have been designed to provide 
mathematical tools for a closer analysis of intriguing linkages between 
the environment and the economy. Starting off with macro-oriented 
models, economists have made many efforts to develop complex, multi-
dimensional models for environmental policy analysis. The use of such 
models has various advantages: 
a concise and systematic representation of impacts of economie 
behaviour on the environment, 
a consistent definition and treatment of concepts and variables 
from different disciplines, 
- a stylized and surveyable description of complex and intertwined 
linkages in environmental-economic systems, 
- a check on methodological and formal consistency of theories 
and conclusions in a multidisciplinary research context, 
an empirical validation of real-world patterns and processes in 
environmental-economic systems, 
- a prediction of expected interdependent developments of economie 
and environmental variables. 
Nonetheless, most environmental-economic models have also several 
limitations such as : 
a strong orientation toward past data neglecting structural changes., 
- a neglect of multiple actor situations and of interest conflicts, 
- a reflection of the status quo in economie thinking, so that 
alternaiive views tend to be disregarded, 
- a macroscopic orientation, so that individual and group motives 
and/or consequences are neglected. 
Thus, in general, environmental economie models do not offer many 
perspectives for dealing with (separable or inseparable) distributional 
issues. This can also be illustrated by paying attention to various 
classes of such models (see also Nijkamp, 1984): 
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materials balance models (see Ayres and Kneese, 1969). 
These models provide a comprehensive picture of physical-
ecological flows in an economy, but have never been used to 
deal with equity issues. 
input-output models (see Leontief and Ford, 1972). 
These models have proven to be very operational tools in 
environmental-economic analysis, but are unable to incorporate 
distributional aspects (except for the spatial distribution of 
po Hut ion). 
integrated environmental models (see Arntzen and Braat, 1983). 
These more recently developed models aim at providing an inte-
grated picture of all components and interactions in an economie 
and ecological system. Distributional impacts can in principle 
be taken into account (land use, mobility, demography, e t c ) , 
though only a few attempts have been made thus far. 
dynamic stock-flow models (see Herfindahl and Kneese, 1974). 
Such models focus attention on dynamic elements in evolving 
ecosystems, based on self-organisation and self-regeneration. 
So far distributional aspects have only received minor attention, 
apart from the abundance of literature on discount rates. 
spatially-oriented economic-envirohmental models (see Spofford, 
1976). 
This class of models includes inter alia urban environmental 
quality models, local land use and energy models, etc. 
The majority of these models is capable to take into account 
equity issues (spatial allocation, pollution impacts, e t c ) . 
environmental evaluation models (see Nijkamp, 1980). 
These models have been designed to take explicitly into account 
the conflicting nature of environmental-economic issues in a 
planning context. A wide variety of such evaluation models has 
been designed in many countries (mainly based on conflict manage-
ment, multiple criteria decision-making e t c ) . The latter 
class of models is also able to encompass equity and efficiency 
considerations simultaneously (see later). 
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In conclusion, only a limited number of models has been designed in 
the past decades that are explicitly able to take simultaneously 
equity and efficiency aspects into account. 
As mentioned before, equity aspects may be related to 3 dimensions, 
viz. space, time and groups (or individuals). The state of the art 
in environmental-economic modeling will be examined in greater detail 
in light of these 3 dimensions, respectively. 
Recently, an international study has been published on the results of 
a cross-national study of multiregional economie models (see Issaev et 
al., 1982). This survey has explicitly paid attention to the place of 
environmental aspects in multiregional economie models. The total number 
of models taken into account in this study amounted to 50. From these 
50 models, only 5 models included a mature environmental sector 
(including energy). A more surveyable picture of these results can be 
found in the Venn diagram in figure 2. 
Figure 2. Venn diagram for the number of models with specific 
components in the international survey. 
The 5 models dealing with spatial environmental-economic equity issues 
originated from West Germany (1), the Netherlands (2), United States 
(1), and Japan (1). 
In conclusion, only in a few countries spatially distributional aspects 
can be included in the operational framework of multiregional, economie 
and environmental models. 
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Next, we will turn to equity aspects in a temporal context. Recently, 
a new cross-national survey has been held focusing more precisely 
the attention on a judgement of the state of the art of environmental 
ecological modeling (see Braat and Van Lierop, 1984). 
This study was meant as a critical review of operational models for 
environmental management in many fields (such as agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, land use, air and water pollution e t c ) . The results of this 
study indicate that equity considerations have never received much 
attention. Only as far as equity is related to environmental impacts 
over different time periods, dynamic ecological-economic models may be 
regarded as tools dealing with distributional aspects. The number of 
models investigated in the abovementioned survey was 90. The number 
of models dealing with multiperiod impacts was approx. 50, though only 
a few of them were explicitly concerned with intergenerational equity. 
More or less the same conclusion can be drawn regarding the third 
dimension, viz. groups. So far, equity aspects for different groups 
have only received minor attention in ecological-economic modeling: only 
a few models could be identified that had the explicit aim to deal 
simultaneously with environmental and (socio)economie impacts for 
different groups (see for instance Hafkamp, 1984). 
For the moment, the conclusion can be drawn that environmental-economic 
models have not paid satisfactory attention to equity issues in environ-
mental policy analysis. A wide variety of verbal and theoretical 
reflection has been provided to the international scientific community, 
but the operational nature of all these attempts has been very moderate. 
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6. A Property Rights Interpretation of Environmental 
Equity Problems 
Environmental management problems deal with complex judgement problems 
of impacts of alternative choice possibilities, varying from a binary 
(zero-one) choice situation to a continuous choice problem (characterized 
by an infinite number of alternatives). Distributional environmental 
and socioeconomic impacts are only one specific class of foreseeable 
consequences of policy actions. The judgement of these impacts on 
injured individuals, groups or regions is an extremely difficult task, 
as has already been illustrated in section 3 with respect to compensatory 
payments. Such compensations aim at making injured individuals, groups 
or regions as well off as they were before they suffered a loss. Clearly, 
the identification of a compensation value (either in money terms or in 
any other meaningful dimension) that will exactly offset the loss they 
have suffered is fraught with difficulties, while in case of 
ambiguous property rights this is sometimes even impossible (especially 
in case of incommensurable effects). 
In particular in a situation with a limited public budget - which is 
the normal situation - a compensation scheme is very hard to use as an 
instrument for neutralizing incommensurable and non-market impacts of 
public decisions. Then it is reasonable to incorporate the distribution 
of the socioeconomic and/or environmental losses as elements in the 
policy analysis itself. 
The social and economie distribution of such losses however are often 
a result of policy decisions at different policy levels. This also 
emphasizes the necessity to pay attention to the institutional structure 
of social evaluation problems in environmental management. It is clear 
that the kinds of decisions taken depend on the legislative, executive 
or managerial level of the policy framework. Lack of co-ordination between 
such different decision levels runs the risk of arriving at suboptimal 
decisions, especially for complex decision problems which are marked by 
different responsibilities for various policy levels or in various 
interest groups. 
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The institutional structure of environmental policy-making is in most 
countries extraordinarily complicated, as it is linked to a great many 
actors in economie, physical, environmental and resource planning. 
Neo-classical welfare theory has never provided a meaningful methodolog-
ical framework that is able to explain the results of conditions under 
which competitive actors or groups on the market for environmental 
commodities are taking decisions. 
In this regard, the so-called property rights theory may provide some 
refreshing contributions (see also De Alessi, 1983, Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973, and Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974). This theory focuses attention 
on the institutional and jurisdictorial regimes governing the decisions 
of actors in a socioeconomic process. A central issue is here thé way 
in which actors are able to use their property rights regarding the use, 
revenue and transaction of commodities. Thus the market value of a 
commodity is strongly dependent on its related property rights. Economie 
dynamics and efficiency is thus influenced by the institutional structure 
of property rights. This theory aims at providing an explanatory para-
digm for economie behaviour of actors operating in different market 
systems, with imperfect information and with different power groups. 
The theory is in agreement with neo-classical utility and welfare theory 
however, in so far as individual utility and welfare maximization is 
presupposed. In general, it is assumed that public intervention is less 
desirable; in general deregulation will already create the conditions 
for economie progr.ess and innovation to emerge. 
The abovementioned theory on property rights may perhaps also be applied 
to environmental management, as it may clarify some dilemma's in the 
efficiency-equity discussion. Let us assume the existence of an environ-
mental commodity sector, governed by either private or public agencies 
that are held responsible for environmental quality in a nation and are 
assumed to deal with environmental property rights. These agencies have 
one major aim (viz. the protection of the quality of life) and are 
operating in an uncertain environment. They do not know precisely the 
strategies and decisions of all actors in this field (such as entre-
preneurs, private interest groups etc.). In order to pursue its tasks 
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effectively, each agency has to collect information on new developments 
and technologies, to handle contracts with all parties involved and to 
check all agreements. All such transaction costs are necessary to survive 
as an environmental protection institution. 
In addition, however, each agency will sooner or later develop its own 
goals: continuity, respect, influence etc. This is the result of the 
aggregate utility maximization of individuals operating in this agency. 
As a consequence of risk behaviour, the original property rights behaviour 
regarding environmental protection are evolving into a much broader com-
plex of goals of this agency (cf. the notion of X-efficiency introduced by 
Leibenstein, 1976). Though formally the objectives of the agency have 
remained the same (viz. management of environmental property rights), the 
informal objectives ( related to institutional property rights) deter-
mining the driving forces of the agency are completely different. In this 
respect, it is much more plausible for the agency to establish formal 
contracts or agreements with other parties involved (entrepreneurs, inter-
est groups, consumers e t c ) , in order to reinforce its position (or to 
survive) on the environmental commodity market. Thus, property rights 
within and between environmental agencies are essential for the outcome of 
environmental management strategies, including the distribution of costs 
and benefits of such policies. Instead of a system of standards, 
charges or- subsidies, the use of property rights is thus determining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of environmental policy. 
The property rights theory acknowledges the existence of external effects 
as a basis for public intervention, but claims also that external effects 
are often a result of a less effective use of property rights. In case 
of environmental property rights, it may then be more efficiënt to 
organize an appropriate market for such rights, so that rights linked to 
each commodity may be bought or sold on a market. 
In case of such property rights attached to environmental commodities 
(or even environmental pollution), one might assume a market for pollution 
rights organized by an environmental agency. The current use of the 
so-called 'bubble'-concept in environmental management is a good reflection 
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of this approach, as it is based on the assumptión that entrepre-
neurs are able to minimize abatement costs in achieving a certain 
prespecified level of air quality by buying and selling pollution rights 
on a market within an industrial 'bubble' (see also Bijman and Nijkamp, 
1983, and Lakhani, 1982). 
In conclusion, rational micro-economie behaviour and complex meso-
institutional structures may be linked together by means of the proper-
ty rights approach. Yet this theory has also some limitations in case 
of environmental management: 
in case of multiple actors affected by environmental deteriora-
tions the transaction costs may become so high that a Pareto 
optimal exchange will not be reached, especially if there are 
also multiple environmental agencies; 
if transaction costs in a property rights context are leading 
to compensatory payments, the amount of compensatory payments 
is very much dependent on the relative power of parties (in-
cluding the environmental agencies); 
the externalities in a property rights context are usually 
dealt with in a fairly superficial way, as no solution is 
provided for 'prisonners's dilemma1 problems. 
Despite these limitations, the property rights theory has also some 
strong elements. In particular, it offers an explanation for conflict 
behaviour within and between environmental institutions. In the frame-
work of a property rights approach, equity aspects can be taken into 
account in two ways: 
by means of the assumptión of property rights attached to 
environmental commodities for which a compensation (via market 
transactions) may take place; 
by means of the assumptión of diverging interests between 
individuals (and/or groups) in various environmental policy 
agencies, or between agencies (and/or actors) mutually. 
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In this regard, separability and inseparability issues in the 
efficiency-equity dilemma can be dealt with simultaneously in the 
framework of conflicts regarding property rights. In the next sec-
tion, some elements of conflict theory will be further discussed. 
7• Elements of Conflict Theory 
In this section, some aspects of conflict analysis will be illustrated 
by means of the abovementioned property rights approach. Assume a hea-
vily polluted industrial area, which has an environmental quality below 
the national average, but a per capita income above the national 
average. The inhabitants of this area will try to organize themselves 
in an environmental agency having the task to improve environmental 
quality, by introducing new technologies and so forth (see McCain, 1978). 
This implies that the intensity of abatement measures has to increase 
(by means of charges, standards, 'polluter pays' principles based on 
property rights, e t c ) , despite resistance of entrepreneurial agencies. 
Clearly, the payment of abatement costs means that the area at hand is 
improving its environmental quality, but is reducing its economie 
efficiency, so that income and employment will show a declining trend. 
In the meantime, the environmental agency has reinforced its position, 
as it is also striving for survival, continuity etc. After some time, 
a reasonable air quality Standard has been attained, so that there is 
no need for an increase in intensity of abatement measures. 
In addition, the inhabitants of the area at hand tend to place now 
more emphasis on employment and income goals as they choose the 
national average as their reference pattern;hence,the environmental agency 
tends to loose power beyond a certain.limit of declining economie ac-
tivities. Then the environmental quality may drastically go down, 
until a critical lower limit of environmental quality has been reached. 
Then the whole process may start again as a wave-like phenomenon (see 
Figure 3). In this figure, q stands for the environmental quality 
in region r , and q for the national average. In essence this 
process reflects an environmental 'keeping up with the Joneses' effect. 
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qr - q 
intensity of 
abatement measures 
Figure 3. Relationship between pollution abatement and 
environmental quality differen.ce. 
The outcome of the abovementioned process very much depends on the 
way environmental property rights are organized and institutionalized, 
and on the way individual and collective preferences regarding socio-
economic and environmental objectives are digested in the environmental 
management system at hand. 
Thus altogether the outcome of the environmental-economic system con-
cerned is dependent on conflicting options of individuals (or groups) 
and agencies in the area at hand. Such problems have in the recent 
past especially been studied in conflict analysis (see among others Chan-
kong and Haimes, 1983, and Isard and Smith, 1983). Conflict analysis 
aims at providing an integrated judgement framework for private and 
public policy choices with different groups and/or interests by consider-
ing simultaneously private economie, socio-economic, environmental, 
energy and equity criteria. The basic assumption of conflict theory 
is that relevant welfare components goveming a choice situation cannot 
be transformedinto a common denominator. . Consequently, a multidimensio-
nal evaluation framework is necessary. This multidimensional approach 
is based on the following features (see also Despontin et al., 1984, and 
Nijkamp, 1979): 
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There is no unambiguous decision-maker who maximizes his welfare 
(utility, profits, e t c ) ; -on the contrary, many decision prob-
lems are rather vague due to the great number of decision groups 
or action groups and due to the existence of conflictual op-
tions. 
Almost all decisions have so many external effects falling outside 
the realm of the traditional market system, that a pure single-
dimensional account of costs and revenues would certaimly lead 
to biased decisions. 
The specification of a generally accepted and representative 
social welfare function is normally an impossible task due to 
the heterogeneity of goals, the conflicts among policy objectives, 
diverging political preferences among decision committees or 
interest groups, the learning character of political choice 
processes, the multilevel structure of many decision processes, 
and spillover effects from decisions taken elsewhere. 
Many applications of conflict analyses can be found in the field of 
modern multi-objective programming and multicriteria analysis. An 
interesting application to efficiency-equity problems in an environ-
mental context can be found in Hafkamp (1984), who has designed a model 
for environmental conflict analysis. This model is based on a so-called 
multilayer projection which indicates that each module of an environ-
mental-economic model may be regarded as a formal homomorphic projection 
of a complex real-world system on a particular field of scientific or 
policy interest (see Figure 4). The distributional aspects of policy 
decisions can then be analysed through the impacts on the successive 
interest groups V...... ,Vfi (socioeconomic classes, residents of 
specific cities etc.) (see also Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1984). As indi-
cated already in Figure 1 , the distributional aspects can be dealt 
with in greater detail by using a matrix (or block) structure for all 
impacts. 
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Figure 4. A multilayer projection of a complex 
system on relevant modules. 
Such a multilayer model is based on a comprehensive multiple-module 
model describing all relevant interactions between the economie sector 
(production, consumption, investments, income formation and distribu-
tion, productivity etc.) and the environmental sector (pollution, 
energy supply and demand, density e t c ) , while also the spatial dimen-
sions have to be taken into account. 
Conflicting interests may be taken into account by specifying objectives • 
for specific groups in either module, viz. income maximizers (I), employ-
ment creators (L) and environmentalists (E). Each of these three ob-
jectives may be present in both the economie (Y) and the environmental 
(N) sector (albeit with different policy weights), so that the following 
typology of objectives may be assumed (see Figure 5): 
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I L E 
Y 
N 
Figure 5. Typology of various conflicting objectives. 
Each element of figure 5 reflects a specific objective function 
(I, L, or E) in a particular sector (Y, N) . In addition, a spatial 
dimension may be added (for instance, a subdivision into areas), so 
that a block structure may emerge. 
In a formal sense, a model of this type can be operationalized by 
introducing alternative environmental policy scenarios, while all 
aspects (efficiency and equity at a spatially detailed level) can be 
taken into consideration by means of interactive programming (based on 
the 'displaced ideals' theory, e.g.) (see for further details, Hafkamp, 
1984, and Nijkamp, 1980). 
In a more illustrative and less formal way, the abovementioned conflict 
analysis may be represented by means of a physical 'flask model', in 
which the two conflicting criteria of efficiency and equity are measured 
on the two necks of the flasks. The multiple layer structure is re-
flected in the hierarchical structure of this flask model, viz. the 
areal subsivision (into areas R.. , R„ , . . . ) and objectives subdivision 
(into I, L, and E). The water level in the necks of this flask model 
may vary according the relative importance attached to the successive 
objectives. Distributional aspects at each spatial level and for each 
objective function can be analysed simultaneously. Differences in 
pressure (i.e., differences in policy priorities) on the water in any 
neck will have efficiency and equity implications for each other sub-
system, based on a 'tatonnement' process. -Interactive policy strategies 
based on various policy scenarios can then be used to arrive at a 
compromise solution among conflicting objectives. In a formal sense, 
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efficiency equity efficiency equity 
Figure 6. A 'flask model' for conflict analysis. 
this compromise solution is then essentially the result of a 
'satisficer' paradigm for ehvironmental-economic behaviour. 
Adaptive behaviour (cf. Day and Cigno, 1978) based on evolution or 
structural changes in the system concerned (formally represented by 
changes in the systems parameters) can also be described by means of 
the flask model by assuming that the width of the neck or the water 
level therein may vary. This implies of course a change in the 
efficiency frontier of the whole system, but the equity and efficiency 
effects can be analysed in a similar manner. 
In conclusion, interactive learning strategie* in conflict analysis 
may be able to treat efficiency and equity considerations simultaneous 
ly in environmental-economic planning models. 
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